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In this paper, we present the notion and construction of
threshold ring signature without random oracles. This is
the first scheme in the literature that is proven secure in the
standard model. Our scheme extends the Shacham-Waters
signature from PKC 2007 in a non-trivial way. We note that
our technique is specifically designed to achieve a thresh-
old ring signature in the standard model. Interestingly, we
can still maintain the signature size to be the same as the
Shacham-Waters signature, while only a tiny computation
cost is added.
Categories and Subject Descriptors




ring signatures, threshold ring signatures, anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as [24,
1, 32, 6, 30, 19, 16]) allows members of a group to sign mes-
sages on behalf of the group without the need to reveal their
identities, i.e., providing signer anonymity. Additionally, it
is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been
issued by the same group member. Different from a group
signature scheme (such as [13, 9, 3]), the group formation
is spontaneous and there exists no group manager to revoke
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the identity of the signer. That is, under the assumption
that each user is already associated with a public key of
some standard signature scheme, a user can form a group
by simply collecting the public keys of all the group mem-
bers including his own. These diversion group members can
be totally unaware of being conscripted into the group.
Ring signature schemes could be used for whistle blow-
ing [24], anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc
groups [8] and many other applications which do not want
complicated group formation stage but require signer anonymi-
ty. For example, in the whistle blowing scenario, a whistle-
blower gives out a secret as well as a ring signature of the
secret to the public. From the signature, the public can be
sure that the secret is indeed provided by a group member
while they will not be able to figure out who the whistle-
blower is. At the same time, the whistleblower does not need
any collaboration of other users who have been conscripted
by him into the group of members associated with the ring
signature. Hence, the anonymity of the whistleblower is en-
sured and the public is also certain that the secret is indeed
leaked by one of the group members associated with the ring
signature.
Ring signature scheme can be used to derive other primi-
tives as well. It had been utilized to construct non-interactive
deniable ring authentication [27], perfect concurrent signa-
ture [28] and multi-designated verifiers signature [21].
Many reductionist security proofs used the random oracle
model [4]. Several papers proved that some popular cryp-
tosystems previously proved secure in the random oracle are
actually provably insecure when the random oracle is instan-
tiated by any real-world hashing functions [10, 2]. Thus, it is
natural to design a practical ring signature scheme provably
secure without requiring random oracles.
Subsequently, there are some ring signature schemes that
do not rely on random oracles exist in the literature. Xu et
al. [31] described a ring signature scheme in the standard
model. But the proof is not rigorous and is apparently flawed
[5]. Chow et al. [15] gave a ring signature scheme with proof
in the standard model, though it is based on a strong new
assumption. Bender et al. [5] presented a ring signature se-
cure in the standard model assuming trapdoor permutations
exists. Their scheme uses generic ZAPs for NP as a building
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block, which may not be practical. Shacham and Water-
s [26] proposed an efficient ring signature scheme without
using random oracles, based on standard assumption. They
rely on composite order pairing that results for a trusted set-
up procedure. Very recently, Schäge and Schwenk [25] gave
another ring signature scheme in the standard model using
basic assumption. In contrast to the previous construction,
they used prime order pairing instead. However, their secu-
rity model does not allow the adversary to query any private
key.
All the above mentioned ring signature schemes only allow
one single signer, which is also known as 1-out-of-n ring
signature scheme [1].
Threshold Ring Signature. A (d, n)-threshold ring sig-
nature has the similar notion to the (1-out-of-n) ring sig-
nature. First, a (d, n)-threshold ring signature scheme re-
quires at least t signers to work jointly for generating a sig-
nature. Second, the anonymity of signers is preserved both
inside and outside the signing group. Third, those t par-
ticipating signers can choose any set of n entities including
themselves without getting any consent from those diver-
sion group members. The first threshold ring signature was
proposed by Bresson et al. [8] in 2002 which is followed by
Wong et al. [30] in 2003. Both of them extend the 1-out-of-n
ring signature from [24] in a different way. However, the idea
of proving “Knowing d solutions out of n problem instance”
[17] was proposed in the early 90s. Liu et al. [22] changed
the idea into threshold ring signature for separate key types.
Subsequently, different types of setting or construction such
as ID-based [14], certificateless-based [12], code-based [23,
18] and lattice-based [11] have also been proposed. How-
ever, all previous threshold ring signature schemes in the
literature (regardless the underlying cryptosystem or con-
struction) can be proven secure in the random oracle or ideal
cipher model only1.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we propose the first threshold ring signa-
ture scheme provable secure without random oracles. It is a
threshold extension of the Shacham-Waters (SW) signature
[26]. However, we have to note that the extension is not
trivial. The typical secret sharing technique cannot be used
in the ring signature case. The modified polynomial inter-
polation technique (e.g. [17, 22, 29]) requires random oracle
to instantiate a signature scheme. Thus, we emphasize that
our technique is specially designed for non-random oracle
security proof. Additionally, we can still maintain the sig-
nature size to be the same as the SW signature, while only
a tiny computation cost is added.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Pairings
We make use of bilinear groups of composite order. Let n
be a composite number with factorization n = pq. We have
• G is a multiplicative cyclic groups of order n.
1Although Han et al. [20] claimed their threshold ring sig-
nature scheme is secure in the standard mode, Tsang et al.
[29] showed that their proof is incorrect. We do not regard
[20] as a provable secure scheme.
• Gp is its cyclic order-p subgroup, and Gq is its cyclic
order-q subgroup
• g is a generator of G, while h is a generator of Gq.
• GT is a multiplicative group of order n.
• ê is a bilinear map such that e : G×G→ GT with the
following properties:
– Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z,
ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab.
– Non-degeneracy: ⟨ê(g, g)⟩ = GT whenever ⟨g⟩ =
G.
– Computability: It is efficient to compute ê(u, v)
for all u, v ∈ G.
• GT,p and GT,q are the GT -subgroups of order p and q,
respectively.
• The group operations on G and GT can be performed
efficiently.
• Bit strings corresponding to elements of G and of GT
can be recognized efficiently.
2.2 Mathematical Assumptions
For our scheme, we assume two problems are difficult to
solve in the setting described above: computational Diffie-
Hellman in Gp and the Subgroup Decision Problem.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman in Gp).
Given the tuple (r, ra, rb), where r ∈R Gp, and a, b ∈R Zp,
compute and output rab. In the composite setting one is
additionally given the description of the larger group G, in-
cluding the factorization (p, q) of its order n.
Definition 2 (Subgroup Decision). Given w select-
ed at random either from G (with probability 1/2) or from
Gq (with probability 1/2), decide whether w is in Gq. For
this problem one is given the description of G, but not given
the factorization of n.
The assumptions are formalized by measuring an adver-
sary’s success probability for computational Diffie-Hellman
and an adversary’s guessing advantage for the subgroup de-
cision problem. Note that if CDH in Gp as we have formu-
lated it is hard then so is CDH in G. The assumption that
the subgroup decision problem is hard is called Subgroup
Hiding (SGH) assumption, and was introduced by Boneh et
al [7].
3. SECURITY MODEL
We give our security model and define relevant security
notions.
3.1 Syntax of threshold ring signature
A threshold ring signature, (TRS) scheme, is a tuple of
four algorithms (KeyGen, Sign and Verify.
• (ski, pki) ← KeyGen(λ) is a PPT algorithm which,
on input a security parameter λ ∈ N, outputs a pri-
vate/public key pair (ski, pki). We denote by SK and
PK the domains of possible secret keys and public
keys, resp. When we say that a public key correspond-
s to a secret key or vice versa, we mean that the se-
cret/public key pair is an output of KeyGen.
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• param ← Setup(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on in-
put a security parameter λ, outputs the set of security
parameters param which includes λ.
• σ′=(n,d,Y,σ)← Sign(e, n, d,Y,X ,M) which, on input
a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of
n public keys in PK, a set X of d private keys whose
corresponding public keys are all contained in Y, and
a message M , produces a signature σ.
• accept/reject← Verify(n, d,Y,M, σ) which, on input a
group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n
public keys in PK, a message-signature pair (M ,σ) re-
turns accept or reject. If accept, the message-signature
pair is valid.
3.1.1 Correctness.
TRS schemes must satisfy: Verification Correctness. That
is, all signatures signed according to specification are accept-
ed during verification.
3.2 Notions of Security of threshold ring sig-
nature
Security of TRS schemes has two aspects: unforgeability
and anonymity. Before giving their definition, we consider
the following oracles which together model the ability of the
adversaries in breaking the security of the schemes.
• pki ← JO(⊥). The Joining Oracle, on request, adds
a new user to the system. It returns the public key
pk ∈ PK of the new user.
• ski ← CO(pki). The Corruption Oracle, on input a
public key pki ∈ PK that is a query output of JO,
returns the corresponding secret key ski ∈ SK.
• σ′ ← SO(n, d,Y,V,M). The Signing Oracle, on input
a group size n, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n
public keys, a signer subset V of Y with |V| = d, and
a message M , returns a valid signature σ′.
Remark: An alternative approach to specify the SO is to
exclude the signer set V from the input and have SO select
it according to suitable random distribution. We do not
pursue that alternative further.
1. Unforgeability.
Unforgeability for LTRS schemes is defined in the fol-
lowing game between the Simulator S and the Adver-
sary A in which A is given access to oracles JO, CO
and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters
param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any adap-
tive strategy.
(c) A gives S a group size n ∈ N, a threshold d ∈
{1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a mes-
sage M ∈M and a signature σ ∈ Σ.
A wins the game if:
(1) Verify(·)=accept.
(2) All of the public keys in Y are query outputs of
JO.
(3) At most (d− 1) of the public keys in Y have been
input to CO.
(4) (M,Y) is not a query input to SO.
We denote by
AdvunfA (λ) = Pr[A wins the game ].
Definition 3 (unforgeability). A TRS scheme
is unforgeable if for all PPT adversary A, AdvunfA (λ)
is negligible.
2. Anonymity.
Anonymity for TRS schemes is defined in the following
game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A
in which A is given access to oracles JO, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters
param.
(b) A may query the oracles according to any adap-
tive strategy. Suppose A makes a total number of
v queries to CO. The restriction is that: v < n−d.
(c) A gives S a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n},
message M , and a set Y of n public keys all of
which are query outputs of JO. S picks randomly
a subset V of Y with |V| = d, such that V is not
contained in any of the queries to SO and CO.
Let X be a set of secret keys with |X | = d and
whose corresponding public keys are all contained
in V. S computes σ′ = Sign ( n, d, Y, V, X , M).
(d) A queries the oracles adaptively. SupposeAmakes
a total number of v′ queries to CO. The restric-
tion is that: v′ < n− d− v. If any of the queries
to SO or CO contains a public key y such that
pk ∈ Y, S halts.
(e) A outputs an index π̂.
We denote by
AdvAnonA (λ) = Pr[π̂ ∈ Y]−
d
n− (v + v′) .
Definition 4 (Anonymity). A TRS scheme is
anonymous if for any PPT adversary A, AdvAnonA (λ)
is negligible.
Summarizing we have:
Definition 5 (Security of TRS Schemes). A TRS scheme
is secure if it is unforgeable and anonymous.
4. OUR PROPOSED THRESHOLD RING SIG-
NATURE SCHEME
4.1 Construction
We extend the 1-out-of-n SW ring signature scheme [26]
into a d-out-of-n threshold setting.
• Setup: The setup algorithm runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq,G,GT , ê) ← G(1λ). Suppose the
group generator G also gives the generators g1, B0, u,




1 . Let H : N×G∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a col-
lision resistant hash function. The public parameters
are
(N,G,GT , ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . . . , uk, H).
Everyone can check the validity of g1, g2, h1, h2 using
pairings.
• KeyGen: For user i, he picks a random xi ∈ ZN . His
public key is gsi1 and his secret key is g
si
2 .
• Sign: Suppose Y = {pk1, . . . , pkn} is the user ring.
X is the set of private keys of d participating signers,
who cooperate to generate the ring signature for the
message M . Without loss of generality, suppose that
{1, 2, . . . , d} is the indices of participating signers, and
{d+ 1, ......, n} is the indices of non-signers.
Define fi such that
fi =
{
1 if i = 1, . . . , d,
0 if i = d+ 1, . . . , n.

























2. Each signer i computes (m1, . . . ,mk) = H(d,Y,









ri , S2,i = g
ri
1 .
Signer i sends (S1,i, S2,i) to the signer in step 1.











The signature is (S1, S2, {Ci, πi}ni=1).
• Verify: On input (n, d,Y,M, σ), first compute (m1, . . .,
mk) = H(d,Y,M). For i = 1, . . . , n, check if




If they are true, compute C =
∏n
i=1 Ci and check if:















































































Theorem 1. The threshold ring signature scheme is un-
forgeable against insider corruption if the CDH assumption
holds in Gp.
Proof. Setup. The simulator B runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq,G,GT , ê) ← G(1λ). B is given the CDH
problem instance (g, ga, gb) ∈ G3p and is asked to output gab.
B first sets an integer, µ = 4qe, and chooses an integer, κ,
uniformly at random between 0 and k. B picks x′, x1, . . . , xk
uniformly at random between 0 and µ−1. B randomly picks
a γ ∈ ZN and sets z1 = g
pγ
q . Since g ∈ Gp, z1 is in Gq. Also
zb1 can be computed from g
b.
B randomly picks a generator h1 ∈ Gq. B randomly picks
y′, y1, . . . , yk, α, β ∈ ZN and sets
g1 = gz1, g2 = g







y1 , . . . , uk = g
xk
2 g
yk , h2 = h
α
1 , B0 = h
β
1 .
Note that ê(g1, h2) = ê(z1, h
α
1 ) = ê(z
α
1 , h1) = ê(g2, h1), s-
ince ê(g, h1) = 1. Finally, B randomly chooses a collision
resistant hash function H : N×G∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k.
Then B gives the public parameters
(N,G,GT , ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . . . , uk,H)
to the adversary A. For a message m = {m1, . . . ,mk}, we
define
F (m) = (N − µκ) + x′ +
k∑
i=1





Assume B picks τ as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , n,
B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:
pki =
{
gsi1 if i ̸= τ ,
gbzb1 if i = τ .
B stores the set of public keys {pki}ni=1.
Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:
• JO: on the i-th query, B returns pki.
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• CO(pki): If i = τ , B declares failure and exits. Other-
wise, B returns gsi2 .
• SO(n, d,Y,V,M): On input a message M , a set of n
public keys Y = {pk′i}ni=1, and a set of d signers V,
B calculates (Ci, πi) according to the Sign algorithm.








Denote m = H(d,Y,M). We also write m into k bits
{m1, . . . ,mk}. If x′ +
∑k
i=1 ximi ≡ 0 mod µ, then B
aborts. For all pki ∈ V and i ̸= τ , B calculates all
(S1,i, S2,i) according to the Sign algorithm. If pkτ ∈







































The simulator will be able to perform this computation
if and only if F (m) ̸= 0 mod N . For ease of analysis
the simulator will only continue in the sufficient con-
dition where x′ +
∑k
i=1 ximi ̸= 0 mod µ. (If we have
x′ +
∑k
i=1 ximi ̸= 0 mod µ, this implies F (m) ̸= 0
mod N since we can assume N > kµ for any reason-
able values of N, k, and µ).
Finally, B calculates the rest of the signature according
to the Sign algorithm.
Output. A returns (n∗, d∗,Y∗,M∗, σ∗). Denote m∗ = (m∗1,
. . . ,m∗k) = H(d
∗,Y∗,M∗). Note that this hash value is dif-
ferent from previous m in various SO queries, since (d∗,Y∗,
M∗) cannot be the input of previous SO queries and H





i ̸= µκ, then B aborts. Otherwise, WLOG,
we assume that pkτ is at the position τ of the signature σ
∗.
Since σ∗ is a valid signature, then















i ) = ê(h1, π
∗




for i = 1, . . . , n∗. Since ê(h1, π
∗






has order q from equation 2. B checks
if (C∗i )
q = 0. If it is true, then C∗i has prder q and then B





has order q and then B sets







1 for some unknown
r′i, no matter fi = 0/1. If fτ = 0, B aborts.
Let δ ∈ ZN such that δ = 0 mod q and δ = 1 mod p. If
we raise equation 1 to the δ-th power, then we have
ê(S∗1 , g1)














δ = ê(S∗2 , g












































since z1 ∈ Gq.








Therefore B can output







as the solution to the CDH problem.
Analysis. Following the probability analysis of Waters sig-
nature, the probability of F (m) ̸= 0 mod N during signing








The probability of not asking pkτ in the corruption oracle
is 1 − qc
n
. The probability of fτ = 1 in the output phase is
d∗







where qs, qc, n is the number of SO, CO and JO respective-
ly.
Theorem 2. The threshold ring signature scheme is anony-
mous against full key exposure if the subgroup hiding as-
sumption holds.
Proof. Setup. The simulator B is given the subgroup
decision problem instance (N,G,GT , ê, g, h). B is asked to
determine whether h ∈ G or h ∈ Gq. B randomly picks the
generators u, u1, . . . uk, B0 ∈ G and α ∈ ZN . B sets
g1 = g, g2 = g
α
1 , h1 = h, h2 = h
α.
Finally, B randomly chooses a collision resistant hash func-
tion H : N×G∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k. Then B gives the public
parameters
(N,G,GT , ê, g1, g2, B0, h1, h2, u, u1, . . . , uk,H)
to the adversary A.
For i = 1, . . . , n, B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:
pki = g
si




B stores the set of public keys and secret keys {pki, ski}ni=1.
Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:
• JO: on the i-th query, B returns pki.
• CO(pki): B returns gsi2 .
• SO(n, d,Y,V,M): B answers by running the Sign al-
gorithm honestly.
Challenge. At some point, A outputs a message M∗, a set
of n∗ public keys Y∗ and a threshold d∗. B picks a random
subset V∗ of Y∗ with |V∗| = d∗, such that V∗ is not contained
in any query to CO. B uses the secret keys of V∗ to run the
Sign algorithm to obtain the signature σ∗. B gives σ∗ to A.
Output. If A can correct guess the index π̂, then B outputs
h ∈ Gq. Otherwise, B outputs h ∈ G.
Analysis. Suppose the challenge signature is (S∗1 , S
∗
2 , {C∗i ,
π∗i }n
∗
i=1) and Y∗ = {pk∗1 , . . . , pk∗n∗}. If h1 is a generator of






Then xi, x̄i correspond to the case f
∗
i = 0 or 1 respectively.
Denote by (π∗i |f∗i = b) the value of π∗i if fi is set to b ∈ {0, 1}.
Then














)x̄i = (π∗i |f∗i = 1).
Therefore {C∗i , π∗i }n
∗
i=1 has no information about the real
signer if h ∈ G.
On the other hand, S∗2 is computed by random number-
s only and do not have information about the real signer.
Finally, S∗1 is determined by the verification equation













Hence, it leaks no useful information about the set V∗. There-
fore if A wins the game, B outputs h ∈ Gq.
4.2.1 Insider Security for Anonymity
From the above security proof of anonymity, we can see
that the adversary cannot win the game even if it is given
all user secret keys (which is known as the full key exposure
attack [5]). According to the security model, the challenge
signature σ∗ is solely generated by the simulator and the
adversary does not obtain any internal information during
the generation of σ∗.
However, our security model does not consider the insider
security during the generation of threshold ring signatures.
The adversary may use the information transferred between
different signers to break the anonymity. In our construc-
tion, S1,i and S2,i are sent from user i to a central signer
who runs step 1 and step 3 of the Sign algorithm. If any S1,i
and S2,i is eavesdropped, or the (malicious) central signer
releases the S1,i and S2,i, then the anonymity of user i is
lost. Therefore, our current security model for anonymity
assumes that the communication channel between signers
are secure, and all signers are trusted during the generation
of the threshold ring signatures. However, our anonymity
model still captures the case that a signer loses his secret
key to the adversary before or after the generation of σ∗.
We just do not allow the adversary to actively participate
in the generation of the threshold ring signature.
4.3 Efficiency Analysis
When comparing our scheme with the 1-out-of-n SW ring
signature scheme, the size of our signature is exactly the
same as the SW scheme. In terms of computation cost,
the overall signing process only increases by some elliptic
curve addition operations. However, if it is measured as per
signer computation, each signer actually requires less, when
compared to the SW scheme. The verification algorithm
only requires 1 more exponentiation to the SW scheme.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an efficient construction of
threshold ring signature without random oracles. Our scheme
is a non-trivial extension of the Shacham-Waters (SW) sig-
nature [26]. Interestingly, we obtained the same signature
size as the Shacham-Waters signature, while only a tiny com-
putation cost is added. We note that our technique has been
specifically customized to achieve a threshold ring signature
in the standard model.
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